University of Colorado Law School

Colorado Law Scholarly Commons
Articles

Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship

2011

Yes, Labor Markets Are Flawed--but so Is the Economic Case for
Mandating Employee Voice in Corporate Governance
Scott A. Moss
University of Colorado Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the
Law and Economics Commons

Citation Information
Scott A. Moss, Yes, Labor Markets Are Flawed--but so Is the Economic Case for Mandating Employee
Voice in Corporate Governance, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 959 (2011), available at
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/faculty-articles/173.

Copyright Statement

Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is
required.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lauren.seney@colorado.edu.

+(,121/,1(
Citation: 94 Marq. L. Rev. 959 2010-2011
Provided by:
William A. Wise Law Library

Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Tue Feb 28 13:51:53 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information

YES, LABOR MARKETS ARE FLAWEDBUT SO IS THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR
MANDATING EMPLOYEE VOICE IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
ScoTT A. Moss*
I. INTRODUCTION
As a leading labor economist, Kenneth Dau-Schmidt is wellpositioned to-and does-offer a persuasive, withering critique of the
Dau-Schmidt documents the
state of American labor markets.'
economy's troubling mix of (a) wage decline for blue-collar workers at
the same time as (b) substantially increased CEO compensation that,
being dependent on short-term stock values, encouraged the excessive
risk-taking that collapsed financial markets in 2008.2 He also effectively
notes key labor market flaws, such as information asymmetries,
employee vulnerability to opportunistic terminations, other bargaining
power disparities, and under-provision of public goods in the
workplace.' These market flaws support Dau-Schmidt's view, which I
share, that various current labor market outcomes disadvantaging
workers are not just unfortunate consequences of hard-hearted, yet
efficient, corporate decisions.! These outcomes also result from market
flaws, and they justify a robust scheme of statutory and other rights for
workers-union rights, compensation rights (wage as well as pension
protections), and rights against employment actions that are
discriminatory, retaliatory, or otherwise opportunistic.
Yet, I find myself unpersuaded by much of Dau-Schmidt's economic
Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. The author thanks
the
following: Paul Secunda, for conceiving and organizing this symposium; Kenneth DauSchmidt, whose gracious feedback on my presentation and prior draft was helpful and deeply
appreciated; fellow symposium participants Joseph Slater, Ann Hodges, Aditi Bagchi, Laura
Cooper, and Michael Fischl; and Andrew Schwartz for his feedback on a prior draft.
1. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American Economy: A
Callfor Comprehensive Reform, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765 (2011).
2. Id. at 793-94.
3. Id. at 781-82.
4. Id. at 780-81.
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case for mandating increased union voice in corporate governance.!
This Essay focuses on the reasons for that skepticism. I believe unions
redress workplace power imbalances as well as a wide range of
workplace violations and inequities, so I agree with union voice in labor
relations because unions properly speak, negotiate, and advocate for
their workers. But Dau-Schmidt argues for "promot[ing] employee
voice in both corporate governance and labor relations,"" and it is on the
former-requiring union voice in corporate governance-that I find the
economic argument wanting for several reasons.
* Most of the labor market flaws Dau-Schmidt notes, such as
employers' incentives to make opportunistic terminations,' are
not flaws that union voice in corporate governance would fix.
* Dau-Schmidt says financial market failures support union voice in
corporate governance," but the labor market lacks analogues to
the main financial market flaws including speculative bubbles;
debt, fraudulently or shortsightedly issued; and hedging and
shorting by the same folks who sold the assets while betting they
would fail.
* Employee voice in corporate governance, as a prescription, overtargets and mis-targets its disease. It goes beyond the market
flaws it targets, yet it would not redress key flaws like short-term
corporate thinking and the manufacturing decline underlying
wage decline.
I come to these views despite sharing Dau-Schmidt's perspective
that economic analysis supports labor market interventions to protect
workers.! I have argued that market forces do not stop discrimination
due to cognitive biases,"o information costs," and cost externalization.12 I
have also argued that even if bias disappears, free markets are too pathdependent to eliminate disparities; that 'labor markets pervasively
5. See id. at 820-31.
6. Id. at 800 (emphases added).
7. Id. at 781.
8. Id. at 820-31.
9. Id. at 821
10. Scott A. Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Public Fundingfor DisabilityAccommodations: A
Rational Solution to Rational Discriminationand the Disabilitiesof the ADA, 33 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 197,207-08 (1998).
11. Id. at 201-03.
12. Id. at 203-06.
13. See Scott A. Moss, Women Choosing Diverse Workplaces: A Rational Preference
with Disturbing Implicationsfor Both Occupational Segregation and Economic Analysis of
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deviate from the rational actor models that underlie skepticism (and
narrow construction) of workplace laws; 4 and that courts hostile to
litigation restrict employee lawsuits with inconsistent rulings" and
procedural barriers. 6 Thus, I am not Dau-Schmidt's most hostile
audience, yet I am still not persuaded by the economic case for
mandating employee voice in corporate governance.
This Essay focuses on my points of skepticism, but that skepticism is
limited to economic arguments for mandating employee voice in
corporategovernance, rather than just in labor matters. These are both
important caveats. I agree wholeheartedly with employee voice through
unions in labor matters, and I see important non-economic arguments
for employee voice in corporate governance, even though the pure
economic arguments are underwhelming. I also do not fault DauSchmidt just because his prescription is no cure-all for the downsides of
a manufacturing and unionization decline that has vexed workers,
policy-makers, and academics for decades. Dau-Schmidt's piece is a real
contribution to the literature on the state of American labor markets
and the appeal of employee voice. This Essay is a modest note of
skepticism about the limited force of certain economic arguments
supporting only the corporate governance portion of his case.

Law, 27 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 82,84 (2004).
14. See Scott A. Moss & Peter H. Huang, How the New Economics Can Improve
Employment Discrimination Law, and How Economics Can Survive the Demise of the
"RationalActor," 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 183, 189-90 (2009).
15. See Scott A. Moss, Fighting DiscriminationWhile Fighting Litigation:A Tale of Two
Supreme Courts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 981, 987-95, 1004 (2007) [hereinafter Moss,

Discrimination] (arguing that courts unduly restrict employee rights lawsuits by an
inconsistent mix of narrowly construing statutes and conjuring up judicially created defenses);
Scott A. Moss, Where There's At-Will, There Are Many Ways: Redressing the Increasing
Incoherence of Employment at Will, 67 U. Prrr. L. REV. 295, 298 (2005) [hereinafter Moss,
At-Will]. /
16. See Scott A. Moss, Reluctant Judicial Factfinding: When Minimalism and Judicial
Modesty Go Too Far, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 549, 552-54 (2009); see also Moss,
Discrimination,supra note 15, at 1004.
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II. THE UNFORTUNATE STATE OF THE BLUE COLLAR LABOR
MARKET-AND THE LIMITED PROMISE OF UNIONIZATION AS REDRESS

A. The Decline of Blue-CollarLabor Due to Intertwined
Increases in Communications Technology, Production
Technology, and Globalization
A key premise of Dau-Schmidt's call for increased worker voice is
that, despite recent decades of mostly solid national economic growth,
"workers' wages and benefits have been stagnant-or even decliningfor decades, increasing income inequality ... as risks of job loss, medical
expenses and training obsolescence have devolved from employers to
employees."17 He notes that the major cause is likely "the rise of global
production using the new information technology," which increased
employer ability to coordinate the production of their suppliers and
contractors worldwide. With increased ease of foreign production of
goods, "Americans compete with workers in developing countries across
the globe [and] cheap labor

. . . put[ting] tremendous downward

pressure on wages and benefits on workers in developed countries.""
Wage stagnation is a complex phenomenon with causes other than
globalization, but other key causes are technological as well. Even aside
from globalization, "improvements in technology," Dau-Schmidt notes,
"have improved capital's productivity . . . increasing capital's share" at

labor's expense."
Because of these changes, primarily driven by technological
innovations, real wages in America have stagnated, especially in
manufacturing. Over the span of a decade, from 2001 to 2010, the
annual consumer price index (CPI) increase was 2.1% (23.5% over 10
years)," and average wages rose by barely more, just 2.8% (32.0% over
10 years).2' But in manufacturing, real wages actually declined, with the

17. Dau-Schmidt, supranote 1, at 767.
18. Id. at 775 & n.42; see also Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Making Globalism Work for Employees,
54 ST. Louis U. L.J. 427, 427-37 (2010) (noting effects of globalization on American
workers).
19. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 1, at 795.
20. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, CPI DETAILED
REPORT DATA FOR SEPTEMBER 2010, at 68 tbl.24 (2010), http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpidl0O9.pdf
[hereinafter BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CPII.
21. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT COST INDEX: HISTORICAL
LISTING, CURRENT-DOLLAR, MARCH 2001 - SEPTEMBER 2010, at 3 tbl.1 (2011),
http://www.bls.govlweblecilechistrynaics.pdf.
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annual increase of only 1.8% (19.6% over 10 years) lagging the CPI.
B. ManufacturingDecline Is the Primary Cause of
UnionizationDecline-So UnionizationIs Dubious
Redressfor ManufacturingDecline
Dau-Schmidt is correct that wages have declined "not only in
manufacturing, but in any service in which work can be digitalized and
sent ... elsewhere in the world."3 Foreign call centers are the most
famous and prevalent example of non-manufacturing jobs being shipped
abroad, and higher-wage service work has gone overseas as well.24
Medical services like radiology may be performed remotely, and media
reports document examples of "medical tourism"-Americans going
abroad for cheap surgeries, from face lifts to cardiac surgery.
But call centers and medical tourism are just a few high-profile
service sector examples; it is manufacturing that has borne the brunt of
globalization-induced and technologically driven wage and job losses in
America.26 Over roughly three decades preceding the 2008 recession
(1979-2007), the service sector grew while the goods-producing sector
Breaking down goods-producing jobs into subcategories
shrank.'
illustrates that manufacturing is where the losses occurred: among the
three goods-producing job categories, construction and mining were
stable while manufacturing declined by over half, from 21.6% of jobs to
only 10.1%, shedding over 5.5 million jobs." No other category lost one-

22. Id.
23. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 1, at 775, n.42.
24. Tom Kisken, Hospitals are Outsourcing Radiology Work, VENTURA COUNTY STAR
(Camarillo), Oct. 17, 2008. According to the article, NightHawk, a company based in Idaho
that serves approximately 1,500 hospitals nationwide, sends scanned radiology images to 120
board-certified radiologists located in the United States as well as Australia and Switzerland.
See id.
25. Website Helps You Mix Medical Treatment, Travel, FORT WORTH STARTELEGRAM, May 23, 2010, at E. Several countries, such as Mexico, Costa Rica, India,
Thailand, and Korea, are becoming more attractive for Americans seeking less expensive
medical treatments while also offering vacation opportunities. See id. For instance, the
typical angioplasty treatment can cost $57,000 in the United States, but will only cost $14,000
in Costa Rica. See id. Similarly, a face lift will only cost approximately $1,000 in India or
Thailand, compared to $15,000 in the United States. See id.
26. See LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, THE STATE OF
WORKING AMERICA 2008/2009 183-85 (2009).
27. See id. at 184 tbl. 3.25
28. Id.
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tenth as many jobs as manufacturing." These job losses accompany the
wage losses detailed above-the decade of real manufacturing wages
lagging the CPI by 0.3% even as wages overall beat the CPI by 0.7%.3
Thus, technology-induced wage and job losses are overwhelmingly a
manufacturing-centered phenomenon.
The manufacturing locus of wage and job loss explains much of the
contemporaneous decline in unionization. Manufacturing was where
unionization and productivity both spiked in the postwar era, when the
United states faced a lack of competition while Europe and much of
East Asia recovered from years of war The recent unionization decline
has been far greater in blue-collar jobs (down 55% from 1978 to 2005)
than white-collar jobs (down 27% during the same period),' leading to
several union-sympathetic economists' conclusion that it is "especially in
the manufacturing sector [that] unions have weakened." 32
With the most unionized part of the private sector, manufacturing,
having shrunk by over half, it is unsurprising that unionization has
declined by over half in blue-collar jobs.33 Certainly, union-sympathetic
laws could stem the tide, while union-hostile laws could accelerate the
decline-and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), during its
control by Republican appointees for the majority of recent decades,
has issued rulings narrowing union rights and powers.3 But with most of
29. See id.
30. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CPI, supra note 20, at 68 tbl.24.
31. See MISHEL ET AL., supra note 26, at tbl.3.35.
32. See id. at 206.

33. Hirsch, supra note 18, at 430 ("[T]he increased challenges for formal unions in the
global economy [are] reflected by the worldwide decline in union membership. And although
not the sole factor, globalism has been a significant contributor to this trend.").
34. As one frequently cited article about the NLRB notes:
[Since] 2004, the Board has issued a remarkable series of decisions
weakening the rights of workers to engage in organizing and collective
bargaining ... authored by appointees of President [George W.] Bush....
This is hardly the first time that the Board has drawn sharp criticism for
being perceived as tilting too far toward management ....
... [President Ronald] Reagan"s initial nominees were not establishmenttype management representatives with a basic commitment to the
NLRA[.]... [T]hey were apostles for union avoidance ....
... [F]rom 1983-85, when the new set of appointees formed a majority,
the Board's pattern of decisions changed remarkably[J ... [having]
upheld only 52% of ... unfair labor practice complaints brought against
employers-a decline of roughly two-fifths .... The results were similarly

telling ... [in] representation cases.
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the unionized sector collapsing, unionization was bound to decline too,
even if union-empowering legal developments-NLRB rulings, National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) amendments, etc.--could decelerate the
collapse somewhat. Jeffrey Hirsch notes that, due to globalization:
seen
their
workers . .. have
[American]
compensation and work conditions deteriorate or have
simply lost their jobs.... [W]orkers' ability to fight these
changes and pressure employers for better conditions has
been undermined by the same global competition that
has led employers to cut labor costs. Demands for better
wages ... are often ineffective, as employers know that
they can eventually move their production elsewhere.35
Many

More generally, where unions achieve gains for workers, it typically
is not by helping to save jobs in dying industries. Rather, unions
disproportionately achieve gains in thriving industries or with individual
employers holding monopoly power. Dau-Schmidt notes as much: "[I]t
seems much more plausible that unions could organize employers who
enjoy product market power rents, Ricardian rents or quasi-rents....
[T]he best available evidence suggests that union wage increases come
largely at the expense of employers and are strongly associated with the
[firm's] market power."' This is a good defense against the argument
that unions' gains damage productivity or kill jobs: unions win gains
mainly where there is plenty of wealth to spread around. But
"globalism has reduced the quantity of such rents and the magnitude of
rents that do exist," which "limits employees' ability to capture
employer rents." 7 If unions achieve gains mainly in thriving sectors,
that calls into doubt how effective unions can be as a bulwark against
the manufacturing decline that is diminishing unions and decreasing
union-provided employee voice.

James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized&The NLRB's Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L.
& POL'Y J. 221, 221, 223, 248 (2005).
35. Hirsch, supra note 18, at 427.
36. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 1, at 806-07.
37. Hirsch, supra note 18, at 437.
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III. LABOR MARKET FLAWS: REAL, BUT NOT NECESSARILY
LENDING SUPPORT TO MANDATING MORE EMPLOYEE
VOICE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Dau-Schmidt correctly catalogues several ways labor markets are
flawed." These flaws each support the case for varied reforms, but few
support the particular reform of mandating more employee voice in
corporate governance.
One labor market flaw Dau-Schmidt mentions is that there are
''significant transaction costs . . . in long complex relationships such as
the employment relationship where it is too costly to completely and
expressly specify all terms of the relationship so that some remain
implicit giving rise to incentives for opportunism" by employers, such as
"incentive to renege on their implicit promise not to discharge
employees before their thirty year pension vested."" It is not clear how
employee voice redresses strong employer incentives to renege on
express and implied deals to pay deferred compensation-pensions,
scheduled commission and bonus payouts, and late-career raises. What
this opportunism risk supports is (a) protection of mandatory long-term
compensation duties for employers, such as guarantees of pension
solvency (e.g., the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation) and (b) an
array of legal doctrines against terminations preventing imminent
vesting of either a pension (e.g., the ERISA bar on taking employment
actions to interfere with pensions") or other deferred compensation
(e.g., the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). 42
Opportunism risk plausibly could support replacing employment at will
with a rule requiring just cause for termination, if opportunism risk is
high enough to outweigh the cost of decreasing employers' personnel
flexibility. A discussion of such a change is beyond the scope of this
Essay; it suffices here to note that none of the relevant redresses for
opportunism, whether narrow protections like ERISA rights or broad
38. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 1, at 781-82.
39. id.at 781.
40. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140
(2006).
41. See Wakefield v. N. Telecom, Inc., 769 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under New York law); see also Fortune v.
Nat'l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251,. 1255-57 (Mass. 1977) (applying the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Massachusetts law).
42. See generally Moss, At-Will, supra note 14, at 303-04, 342-62 (discussing economic
and social norm theories supporting a broad array of such protections under state common
law).
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protections like for-cause rights, are really about employee voice.
The second labor market flaw Dau-Schmidt notes is
"'information asymmetry' ... [flor example, if employees do not
understand that the chemicals they work with will cause cancer in
twenty years." 3 But if employees do not know these flaws, it is not clear
how more employee voice would help. This flaw supports aggressive
regulation of risks employees cannot anticipate well-workplace toxins,
pension fund bankruptcy, etc. While this flaw also does not support
employee voice, it does support mandatory employer disclosure of
known risks (akin to consumer warnings), mandatory workplace
postings on worker rights, etc."
A third labor market flaw Dau-Schmidt notes is, at least in certain
industries, that "employers generally have [much] more bargaining
power because they have more choice of employees than the employees
have choice of jobs, and large employers are usually not significantly
inconvenienced by the loss of an employee, while an employee loses his
or her livelihood with the loss of a job."45 This flaw supports
unionization to beef-up worker bargaining power, but the benefit of the
union here is its raw power in labor negotiations, not its voice.
Fourth, and less typically noted, is Dau-Schmidt's creative point that
"many terms of employment are 'public goods"' because they are "nonrivalrous, in that many people can enjoy the same good, and nonexcludable," in that the producer of the public good "cannot exclude
others from also enjoying" it:"
[E]xamples in the workplace include the speed of the
assembly line, the cleanliness of workplace air, the level
of noise in the plant, and even the type of health
insurance the employer provides.... [Elach employee
has incentive to hold back and 'free-ride' on the efforts
of others to gain the public good, with the result that too
43. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 1, at 781.
44. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 294 (5th ed.
2001). "Market failure can also occur when consumers lack information about the quality or
nature of a product and so cannot make utility-maximizing purchasing decisions." Id.
Because consumers may lack this information, government intervention may be necessary to
avoid this failure in the market. "Truth in labeling" is one example of government
intervention aimed at ensuring consumers have adequate information to make utilitymaximizing decisions about the products they purchase.
45. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 1, at 782-83.
46. Id. at 781-82.
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little of the good is negotiated.7
Theoretically, a lack of workplace public goods supports DauSchmidt's prescription of union voice. At least for public goods
benefitting employees (e.g., air quality-but not assembly line speed,
which benefits the employer more), a union includes all benefitting from
the good, so unions have more incentive than any one worker to pursue
a good and explain its need. But there is not clearly a deficit of
workplace public goods, in the sense of things one or few employees
control or know, yet from which many would benefit. Certainly many
workplaces' air quality, insurance, etc., is subpar-but how much of the
cause is the "public good" problem that only a small number of
employees know of the problem or have incentive to fix it? Many'
employers offer subpar air, insurance, etc., just to save money-not
because employees fail to know or explain the problem enough.
Ultimately, Dau-Schmidt's public goods suggestion is intriguing, but
brief and largely theoretical. This argument could be a topic for future
work, but for now it is just a theoretical possibility.
In sum, most of the labor market flaws Dau-Schmidt notes
(opportunism, information asymmetry, and bargaining power) do not
support mandating more employee voice in corporate governance;
others, including the under-provision of public goods, are insufficiently
shown to exist. More generally, Dau-Schmidt's Article seems to
mismatch problems (various labor and financial market flaws) with
solutions (mandating more employee voice). As Josh Wright has
argued, "it is incredibly common practice ... to jump from the
identification of a behavioral or cognitive bias ... to accepting that some
regulation must be appropriate."4 All markets are imperfect; just
noting a flaw or bias and then "argu[ing] that the bias undercuts" all
market outcomes provides insufficient basis for any particular reform.49
The relevant questions are which particular flaws exist, in which market,
and which particular regulations might redress these flaws. As discussed
in the next section, Dau-Sclimidt is even more adventurous in claiming
support for his proposed labor market reform based on the failures of
financial markets, which trace substantially to flaws entirely absent from
47. Id. at 782; see generally PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 44, at 644-49.

48. Posting of Josh Wright to Truth on the Market, http://truthonthemarket.com/
2009/08/21/jones-v-harris-and-some-ramblings-on-burdens-of-proof-empirical-evidence-andbehavioral-law-and-economics/ (Aug. 21, 2009, 11:19 EST).
49. Id.
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labor markets.

IV. FINANCIAL MARKET FLAWS: SUBSTANTIAL,

BUT
LARGELY IRRELEVANT TO LABOR MARKETS
The 2008 financial crisis and ensuing recession showed financial
markets to be deeply flawed, and Dau-Schmidt sees these market flaws
as a sufficient indictment of corporate decision-making to justify
mandating more employee voice as a way to inject new blood into a
failed corporate decision-making structure. He notes that "the near
collapse of our financial system" has made "particularly acute" the
problem of "subordination of workers' interests in ... corporate
governance and labor relations."'o Employee voice thus could improve
corporate decision-making and thereby improve employee welfare, he
argues.
Financial market flaws do support regulation of (a) financial markets
and (b) executive compensation-and employee voice could help as to
the latter. But the key financial market flaws are absent from labor
markets, and thus have no relevance to labor markets, other than as to
executive compensation." And there is reason to doubt that employee
voice would have prevented the short-term profit-seeking mentality
underlying the financial crisis. So it is hard to see how financial markets'
failure supports Dau-Schmidt's proposed reform.
A. FinancialMarket Flaws Irrelevantto Labor Markets:Bubbles,
Securitization,and Hedging and Other Bets on Failure
While views vary on the causes of the financial crisis, "bubbles" in
financial and real estate values were a key market failure,52 though other
First, major
information-related flaws also underlie those bubbles.
50. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 1,at 784.
51. See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT

S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS

301 (8th ed. 2003); see also Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, If So,
What If Anything Should Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE LJ. 1013,1040-41 (2009).
52. Posner, supra note 51, at 1040-41.
53. Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An Experimental-Asset-MarketApproach to
Analyzing Financial Regulation, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 977, 1032 ("[M]any of the same
phenomena that may contribute to the rise of asset-price bubbles - for example, behavioral
biases and feedback loops - reverse dramatically and destructively during a bubble's
collapse."); Nadelle Grossman, Turning a Short-Term Fling Into a Long-Term Commitment:
BoardDuties in a New Era, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 905, 936 (2010).
[I]nformation biases... make investors more short-termist than they

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

970

[94:959

financial institutions on which the entire system depended (AIG,
Lehman Brothers, etc.) were worth so much less than everyone thought
that they could not survive, and millions of homeowners, once rates rose
or once they lost their jobs, held mortgages they could not afford or that
came to be worth more than their properties." It is hard to see much
analogy to labor markets, where bubbles do not exist. Labor may be
overvalued, but when attorneys are overpaid, layoffs, pay cuts, and
cheaper billing correct excess more easily than pricey thirty-year
mortgages can be corrected. At worst, some labor markets are slow to
adjust to changed demand for a slow-to-develop skill, and "the failure of
[labor] supply to adjust immediately to changed market conditions can
cause boom-and-bust cycles.",5 If demand for a new skill increases
rapidly (e.g., computer programmers in the 1990s), wages may spike
until the years it takes for more workers to develop the skill;' if demand
for the skill later decreases, wages will sharply decline because of the
glut of workers who developed that skill.5 ' But wages rising and falling
sharply to reflect skill scarcity or surplus accurately is not a bubble akin
to the inaccurately inflated, then collapsing, values that financial
markets see.
Second, securitization and derivatives of overvalued assets, like real
estate, made the financial bubble much more widely spread in the
economy." Seemingly safe mutual funds and retirement investments
came to include risky real estate debt packaged into "investment-grade
mortgage-backed securities" that eventually proved "far riskier than

might otherwise be. Investor short-termism also emerges from investors'
irrational behavior, exemplified by the current financial crisis in which
investors got caught up in the housing bubble and herded to the same
financial securities despite the long-term risks of those investments.
Grossman, supra, at 936.

54. Gregory Scott Crespi, The Trillion Dollar Problem of Underwater Homeowners:
Avoiding a New Surge of Foreclosures by Encouraging Principal-Reducing Loan
Modifications, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 153, 153-54 (2011) ("[T]here are at least 11.3
million U.S. homeowners, and probably as many as 15.2 million or more, who are
'underwater' in that the outstanding balances on their mortgages exceed the market value of
their homes .... These two estimates constitute 23% and 32.2%, respectively, of all
mortgaged residential properties.").
55. EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 51, at 301.
56. See id. at 30142.
57. See id.

58. See generally Timothy M. Sullivan, Federal Preemption and the Rating Agencies:
Eliminating State Law Liability to Promote Quality Ratings, 94 MINN. L. REV. 2136 (2010).

LABOR MARKETS ARE FLAWED

2011]

971

previously thought."S9 Labor markets have no real analogue to
securities and derivatives, so the failure of certain workplaces or job
types does not broadly infect the entire economy, such as by destroying
a pension fund unrelated to the collapsing workplace or job category.
Third, real estate markets feature another flaw labor markets lack:
players betting on, or indifferent to, failure. Sketchy mortgage peddlers
(brokers and banks alike) had incentive to expand their customer base
by offering mortgages to those previously, and accurately, deemed bad
mortgage risksW Such mortgages unsustainably depended on a mix of
initially low, but rising, adjustable rates" and income-reporting fraud.62
Such ill-fated overselling has no labor market analogue. The closest
might be headhunters and placement agencies-but those entities play a
limited role in labor markets and cannot drive excessive hiring or wages
to the extent financial markets saw with mortgages. Worse, "hedging"
and "shorting" deeply wounded financial markets: major financial
players drew profit from the failure of even investments and assets they
59. Id. at 2145-46.
Large scale investors ... [including] pension funds invested heavily in
mortgage-backed securities... [that,] especially those rated investment
grade, were insulated from loss by overcollateralization of the investment
pool and subordination of riskier tranches....
[But] [a]s defaults and foreclosures mounted, mortgage-backed
...
securities became distressed....

[and] investment-grade mortgage-backed securities looked far
...
riskier than previously thought. All three of the major rating agencies
quickly lowered their ratings for large swaths of mortgage-backed
securities.

Id.
60. Claire A. Hill, Who Were the Villains in the Subprime Crisis,and Why It Matters, 4
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS.

L.J. 323, 323-33 (2010).

61. Kyle Cutts, Comment, City on the Brink: The City of Cleveland Sues Wall Street for

Public Nuisance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1399, 1408 (2008) (noting "estimates that 2.5
million adjustable-rate mortgages will adjust to higher rates ... , threatening households
already struggling to pay the lower rates. Often, this leads to default").
62. Hill, supra note 60, at 335.
A mortgage originator making a loan that would very quickly adjust to
require a payment the originator basically knew the borrower could not
afford might not have been lying .... But the strategy behind such loans

would seem to have been to make many of them, quickly realize large
amounts of fee income, and be nowhere around when the defaults began

Id.
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had marketed or touted themselves.' There is no analogue to hedging
or shorting in labor markets, nothing encourages excess hiring by
allowing a firm to profit from worker failure.
In sum, financial markets feature numerous flaws that labor markets
do not. Much of the financial crisis, therefore, is not very relevant to
labor markets. I agree that labor market regulation conceivably could
draw support from two particular financial market flaws detailed below:
excessive executive compensation and unduly short-term decisionmaking. But as discussed below, the executive compensation problem
supports only limited reform, and unduly short-term decision-making is
a problem unions are unlikely to redress.
B. Executive Compensation EncouragingShort-Term Thinking and
Bad Risk: A Real Inefficiency, but One Supporting Only Limited Reform
While America has seen declines in real wages for blue-collar and
manufacturing workers, "American corporations have bestowed on
senior executives enormous compensation packages that seem
increasingly divorced from ... rationality."" Executive compensation
has notoriously sharp ups and downs, unlike slowly rising hourly wages,
but, overall, the average annual rise has been substantial." After
stagnating in the early 1990s, Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
compensation more than doubled in a decade, rising 240% from 1995 to
2005.6
Skyrocketing executive compensation is a problem of both fairness
and morality, but it also is a problem of inefficiency, in two ways. First,
executive compensation exceeds efficient levels due to several market
63. Id. at 332-33.
The clearest examples of villains in the subprime crisis engaged in
behavior that was clearly illegal[, such as] ... [a] mortgage broker who
lied about the borrower's income when selling the loan to a third
party....

[T]he behavior of Ameriquest, a subprime mortgage loan originator[,] ...
included deceiving borrowers about the terms of their loans, forging
documents, falsifying appraisals and fabricating borrowers' income to
qualify them for loans they couldn't afford (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
Id.

64. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 1, at 766.
65. Posner, supra note 51, at 1021-22.
66. See id.
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flaws, mainly principal-agent problems of CEOs being hard to police
when they pursue their own interests." Corporate boards of directors,
which typically include CEOs and similar magnates, are too disengaged
and easily captured by a CEO community self-interested in supporting
deference to CEOs and high CEO pay." Second, recent forms of
executive compensation have incentivized excessive corporate risktaking and short-term thinking, a phenomenon also driven by investors
with short-term horizons.' To redress their difficulty policing CEOs,
corporations typically align their incentives with compensation packages
heavy in stock and options-which increases CEO stake in the
company, but also encourages short-term thinking and risk-taking."
CEOs may take risks with negative expected value because they draw a
fully proportional share of the benefit of gains (stock appreciation) but a
less than proportional share of the cost, limited to the value of the lost
equity (i.e., lost value of underwater options or lost value of stock upon
company bankruptcy)." Similarly, CEOs have incentive to take risks
that pay off short-term but are disastrous long-term (riding bubbles,
taking on debt, etc.), as long as they plan to retire, or otherwise move
on, in a few years.' These incentives increase risk-taking by executives
who are already likely to be risky, because the typical corporate culture
rewards and promotes those prone to optimism and risk-taking.73 This
CEO risk-taking incentive was one cause of the disastrously risky
lending, and leveraging of corporate assets to take on high-yield
67. See id. at 1023-24.
68. See id.; D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and Executive

Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 871 (2007) (highlighting the problematic "dynamic
whereby corporate executives sit on corporate boards and pay their peers salaries in line with
what they in turn would want to be paid").
69. Grossman, supra note 53, at 905-06.
There is significant pressure ...

,

both from executives as well as from

investors, to ... produc[e] profits over a short period of time, ... without

regard to the ill effects of those decisions on the longer-term health of the
business. This tendency to manage for the short-term, or "shorttermism," in large part explains the near collapse of institutions like AIG
and Merrill Lynch that seemed almost impregnable not long ago.
Id.
70. See Posner,supra note 51, at 1026-30.
71. Id. at 1026-27.
72. Id. at 1041.
73. Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 101, 153-55 (1997).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

974

[94:959

investments, underlying the 2008 financial crisis.'
Complaints about excessive pay and irresponsible corporate
decision-making used to draw stern rebuke from free-market
economists, but the 2008 financial crisis has led to some newfound
support for regulating corporate pay and lending. "The problem of
executive compensation is not only real," Judge Richard Posner wrote
in 2009, "it is more serious than I believed it to be."" -Alan Greenspan
went further, opining: "It may be necessary to temporarily nationalise
some banks in order to facilitate a swift and orderly restructuring." 6
Union voice in corporate governance conceivably could redress
excessive executive pay; the union could object to pay packages that
seem excessive in size or, more importantly, excessively composed of
equity. At the least, unions could hardly do worse than corporate
boards, which have been quite weak policers of executive pay.n But
there are reasons to question the compensation-policing voice that
unions would provide. Unions seem likely to focus on limiting the size,
rather than the equity-based composition, of executive pay. But it is the
equity, not the size, that is the problem, and capping compensation
amounts risks diminishing the available talent pool. Even if unions did
focus on equity compensation rather than just on compensation
amounts, equity compensation is not unequivocally bad. By design, it
increases the CEO's stake in the company and discourages
complacency; it just comes with the tradeoff of encouraging more risk.
So a policy against equity compensation, or in favor of lower
compensation generally, would not necessarily be a net positive. In sum,
union voice might help redress excessively short-term corporate
thinking by limiting the excessive equity compensation that promotes
74. Posner, supra note 51, at 1041.

75. Id. at 1014.
76. Krishna Guha & Edward Luce, Greenspan Backs State Control for Banks,
FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 18, 2009, § 1, at 1. To be sure, others stood by their
lifelong fealty to the free market: "It's bad," Larry Ribstein wrote of capping CEO
compensation even at only those firms receiving federal bailout funds; under simple labor
supply-and-demand logic, "executive talent and banking business ultimately will go to [other]
firms" lacking such restrictions. Posting of Larry Ribstein to Ideoblog, http://busmovie.
typepad.com/ideoblog/2009/10/perspectives-on-feinberg-pay.html (Oct. 22, 2009,07:43 EST).
77. Telman, supra note 68, at 859. Telman quoted older commentary on executive

compensation problems inferring that past commentary is still applicable to current executive
compensation issues. See id. "[Clorporate boards' one significant remaining responsibility is
the selection and monitoring of the corporation's CEO. However, passivity characterizes the
board's typical role in that process as well." Id. (citing MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE
STRUCrURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 162,164 (1976).
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short-term thinking-but union voice might limit compensation too
greatly, yielding countervailing problems. And beyond the specific role
of policing executive compensation, union voice is an unlikely way to
promote long-term thinking, as detailed below.
C. Unions Are Not Generally More Long-Term in Focus than
Corporations,So More Union Voice Is Unlikely to Increase Innovation
I take an overall positive view of unions, and I agree that more union
voice conceivably could help prevent the forms of executive
compensation that encourage short-term thinking; however, I disagree
as to another way Dau-Schmidt suggests unions could promote longterm corporate welfare. Dau-Schmidt expresses optimism that unions
could help corporations as "an important long-term ally in considering
the merit of long-term strategies and investments" because their
"investments in firm-specific human capital and pensions" give them an
"interest in the long run operation of the firm." 8
Dau-Schmidt thus sees unions as forces for innovation that, had
there been more voice in corporate governance in recent decades, might
have persuaded American automakers not to lag in alternative energy.'
Yet it is too easy to pick on American automakers for allowing Toyota
to take the lead with the wildly successful Prius, for example. DauSchmidt says the high oil prices generated by the 1970s OPEC embargo
"should have removed all doubt" that "fuel economy would eventually
become of crucial importance."8' I am dubious: with gas prices low for
over two decades before 2005, the viability of high-cost research into
high-priced hybrids was far from certain. Failing to develop an
"American Prius" seems a huge blunder only in retrospect: for every
"hybrid cars are the future," plenty supposed "waves of the future"
flop-day trading, mortgage securitization, and various internet
startups, to name just a few.8' And which waves of the future will fail is
as hard to predict as which will succeed. Leading voices in corporate
law called for the acceleration of trends that proved to be as bad as
Even where an innovation like
mortgage-backed securities."
78. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 1, at 767.
79. Id. at 819.
80. Id. at 789.
81. See STARTUP.COM (Artisan Entertainment 2001). Startup.com is a documentary
film that chronicles the start-up phenomenon and failure of the website govWorks.com.
82. Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1707, 1707-08 (1998). Ribstein advocates for revision of legal ethical rules to allow non-
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alternative-energy cars succeeds, it is hard to tell success from failure ex
ante. Hybrids succeeded while hydrogen-powered car subsidies seem a
waste and Google succeeded while AOL stalled only after markets
believed the inflated valuation that let AOL buy TimeWarner.8
Perhaps the American failure to develop hybrid cars was a foreseeably
bad decision, as opposed to only a retrospectively bad one, but I am not
so sure.
But I am skeptical of Dau-Schmidt's point in a broader way: I do not
see how workers have more interest in long-term corporate well-being
than managers or stockholders. Even far-sighted workers' interests in
their employers' long-term well-being has declined due to trends DauSchmidt notes, such as decreased job security, tenure length, and
pensions," and the decline of the old life-cycle labor model under which
firms invested in training on the now-quaint assumption that workers
will spend their careers in one place.' With companies offering workers
fewer future prospects, workers have less reason to care deeply about
the company's future. So while workers may have the most to lose when
their employers fail, I disagree with Dau-Schmidt's premises that "the
workers [are] the party with the true long-term investment in the
enterprise"" and that "labor is emerging as the stakeholder with the
greatest personal interest in the [firm's] long-run operation.""
Even if workers remained focused on their employers' long-term
interests, unions are unlikely to do so, because union management faces
its own agency problems. Union leaders have incentive to focus on the
present and upcoming collective bargaining agreement, which
determines their success, failure, and re-election-a time horizon of only
several years. Union negotiations for benefits can make employers act in
even more short-sighted ways, such as agreeing to large future pensions
the employer fails to fund contemporaneously-essentially putting

competition agreements among law firms, in part to "protect law firms' property rights in
expertise on, and forms for, transactions such as ... mortgage-backed securities." See id. at
1737.
83. Tim Arango, In Retrospect: How It Went So Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, January 11, 2010, at
1 (explaining the downfall of the AOL/TimeWarner merger).
84. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 1, at 798 ("The security of employer-provided employee
benefit plans has ... declined in the last three decades.").
85. See generally Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and
Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8 (1993) (noting decline of career-wage model).
86. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 1, at 790.
87. Id. at 801 (so asserting as to BP).
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compensation of current workers off-budget into the future.'
So despite their other merits, unions are unlikely forces for
innovation-and at times they can even be quite anti-innovation. Are
unions really more interested than management in sacrificing present
revenue by spending on research and development whose fruits are
uncertain? Evidencing the contrary, a major national union recently
declared war on clean energy subsidies, arguing that such subsidies harm
the status quo. In September 2010, a charge filed "by the 850,000member United Steelworkers union[] accuse[d] China of violating the
World Trade Organization's free-trade rules by subsidizing exports of
clean energy equipment like solar panels and wind turbines."" Perhaps
this charge has merit, but it might illustrate how unions can be an
unlikely source of support for investments in environmental or other
innovations that would divert present funds into pursuits that, at best,
pay off much later. This is no indictment of unions in particular; unions
simply are no better than any other entity or group at foreseeing the
future or at sacrificing current money for potential future gain.
A full discussion of redressing short-term corporate thinking is
beyond the scope of this essay, but shareholder information seems key
to any solution. With informed shareholders, corporations could not
think unduly short-term; without informed shareholders, corporations
seem likely to get away with short-term thinking. There is room for
disagreement as to how to serve the need for better shareholder
information. On one side would be advocacy for information-forcing
88. Based on pension promises made for prior generations of workers, but inadequately
funded since, state and local "[plublic pensions ... are underfunded by more than $1 trillion;
in many cities, pension obligations will soon consume a quarter or more of the annual
budget." Richard Riordan & Alexander Rubalcava, Op-Ed., How Pensions Can Get out of
the Red, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2010, at A33. This phenomenon should not be overstated for

two reasons, however. First, unusually generous pensions aside, there often are reasons for
public employee pensions to be larger than their private counterparts, from the lower salaries
of public employees to the unavailability of social security benefits for almost a third of state
and local employees. THOMAS MARGENAU, INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION OF EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT PLANS, SOCIAL SECURITY OFFSETS: POLICIES PUBLIC EMPLOYEES LOVE TO

HATE AND DON'T UNDERSTAND 3 (2007) (noting, as an example, that California and Texas
teachers do not receive social security). Second, major public employee pensions have been

getting less generous; for example, in 2010, Illinois raised retirement ages, limited pension
increases, capped benefits, and ended pensions for retirees working another public job. Ben
Smith & Maggie Haberman, Pols Turn on Labor Unions, POLITICO.COM, June 6, 2010,

http:i/www.politico.cominews/storiesl0610/38183.html.

I thank Joseph Slater for calling my

attention to the Margenau and Smith and Haberman pieces.
89. Keith Bradsher, U.S. Steelworkers See Illegal Subsidies in Clean Energy Industry,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,2010, at B1, B7.
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regulations,"0 or even banning risky practices about which information
cannot reasonably be spread. On the other side would be the libertarian
view that useful information will find its way into shareholders' hands,
or at least that those who decline to become informed are making a
choice that, for example, their modest 401K holdings do not justify
investing in more information." Whether provided by regulation or by
free markets, information for shareholders seems a better solution to
short-term thinking than mandating an additional voice by employees
unlikely to focus on the corporate long term.
V. THE UNPERSUASIVENESS OF COMPARATIVE EXAMPLES:
JAPAN AND GERMANY AS DUBIOUS ROLE MODELS

Finally, Dau-Schmidt cites Japan and Germany as exemplars, citing
approvingly to work "distinguish[ing] between 'liberal market'
economies,. .. [such as] the United States and Great Britain, and
'coordinated market' economies, for example Germany and Japan,....
[which] undertake alliances that involve labor to conduct corporate
governance."9
But Japan and Germany are hardly economic role models; they have
not looked like the wave of the future since the 1980s. Japan has had
stagnant growth for two decades. Since 1991, it has not had a single year
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth above 3.3%, and for a
majority of years it has had growth rates under 1% or negative.93
90. Of course, forcing more disclosure of information about investments is an old goal of
securities law. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) ("The design of the
statute is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to
informed investment decisions."). This could make information-forcing regulations seem a
solid, mainstream prescription. On the other hand, if decades of information-focused
regulation has fallen short, that failure might call into question whether more information
really is a useful prescription. Ultimately, though, the question of what further regulations of
financial markets are warranted, if any, is well beyond the scope of this paper.
91. This is the concept of "rational ignorance[:] ... situations in which people may
rationally prefer not to know their own preferences-not to read forms, seek advice, or
perform research-because the costs of doing so are too high." Adam S. Zimmerman,
FundingIrrationality,59 DUKE L.J. 1105, 1121-22 (2010) (describing rational ignorance in the
context of individuals deciding whether to submit claims for their share of class action
litigation proceeds).
92. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 1, at 809-10.
93. Takatoshi Ito & Frederic S. Mishkin, Two Decades of JapaneseMonetary Policy and

the Deflation Problem 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10878, 2004),
availableat http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/publicidocuments/apcity/unpan 023671.pdf.
The average growth rate from 1993 to 2003 is just above [one] percent.
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Germany has fared little better, with its stagnation taking the form of
high unemployment instead of stagnant growth.'
"Since 1992,
Germany's GDP growth has been mediocre, falling behind many
European countries, particularly those in Eastern Europe."" In the past
fifteen years, Germany has had only two years of 3% growth or better,
and its unemployment rate has been no lower than 7.4%, usually
hovering around 9%." Much of its difficulty traces to the unification of
West Germany with the far less prosperous East Germany-but
Germany's unemployment problem is not solely an Eastern problem.
From the early 1990s until recently, West Germany's unemployment
rate typically has ranged from 8-10%," only in 2009 dropping to 7.0%."
Dau-Schmidt acknowledges these facts, conceding that compared to
Japan, "the United States seems to enjoy advantages in market
flexibility, job creation and innovation," but he argues that Japan's
system helps it "provid[e] high wages and low unemployment."9 Yet
high wages cannot long remain a feature of an economy that, like Japan,
suffers decades of low or negative economic growth. When per capita
GDP is stagnant for decades, average wages cannot keep rising. I do
not mean to overstate the point, but just to note that even if what DauSchmidt suggests is good policy, its adoption in once-promising yet longstagnant economies like Japan and Germany is a damning, not
supporting, fact.

Since 1998, the inflation rate, either measured by GDP deflator or CPI,
has been negative. The deflation has brought the CPI price level by the
end of 2003 to 3% below the 1997 level.... Due to virtually zero growth
and deflation, the Japanese nominal GDP has shrunk by 4% from 1997 to
2002 ....

Id.
94. Polya

Lesova,

The

Wall's Fall Proved a Boom for German Equities,

Nov. 9, 2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-walls-fallproved-a-boom-for-german-equities-2009-11-09.
MARKETWATCH.COM,

95. Id.

96. Index Mundi, http://www.indexmundi.com/germany/unemploymentrate.html (last
visited May 13,2011) (illustrating historical data on Germany's unemployment rate).
97. Helmut Seitz, Presentation at the Conference on German Unification at University
of Haifa 15 (Jan. 21-22, 2009), available at http://www.tu-dresden.delwwvwlempipublikationl
Praesentation_on_the_economicandfiscalconsequences_%20of_GermanUnification.pdf.
98. Lesova, supra note 103.
99. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 1, at 819.
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VI. CONCLUSION: A LIMITED SKEPTICISM

This essay offers a limited skepticism of the economic case for
mandating union voice in corporate governance. Union voice certainly
has a core role as to labor relations. It communicates worker wage and
benefit priorities, e.g., what mix of wages, health benefits, and
retirement benefits are preferable; it provides a safer and surer
mechanism than individual worker complaints for reporting workplace
problems; and it complements other forms of social voice for workers,
such as litigation and lobbying. My skepticism is limited to the
economic case for mandating union voice in non-labor corporate
governance matters. .
Perhaps most importantly, there are broader, non-economic
arguments for increased union voice, such as the dignitary value of the
right to be heard, long acknowledged in the context of litigation and
alternative dispute resolution,""' and the value of feeling a stake in one's
job.o' Dau-Schmidt notes this point: "Promoting employee voice ...
treats workers more as humans than a commodity, giving them a larger
say in the rules that organize our society."' And I fully agree with Dau-

Schmidt's broader sentiment that "it is imperative that we take account
of values other than efficiency in the regulation of the labor market,"
values that tend to be "lost in the simple neoclassical economic
model.""
Thus, this Essay's skepticism of Dau-Schmidt's economic case is not
opposition to proposals for "a significant and meaningful voice for
American workers on the corporate Board of Directors," such as DauSchmidt's suggestion of modest union representation on the corporate
boards of sufficiently large corporations." That is, more union voice in
corporate governance may be a good idea, but the case must be made on
the non-economic grounds that Dau-Schmidt cites but gives less "air
100. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666 (2d ed. 1988)
("[T]here is intrinsic value in the due process right to be heard, since it grants to the
individuals or groups against whom government decisions operate the chance to participate in
the process by which those decisions are made, an opportunity that expresses their dignity as
persons.").
101. Moss & Huang, supra note 14, at 234 (noting that many people "draw from their
job [a] sense of self-worth .. ." and source of identity (citing Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting
for Employment: The Limited Return of the Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783, 1803

(1996))).
102. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 1, at 807.
103. Id. at 784.
104. Id. at 824.
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time" than his economic-based arguments. This need to prioritize noneconomic arguments recalls Richard Posner's caveat on the limited
power of economic logic to explain all law: "So law and economics are
not perfectly congruent after all. But you knew that.""

105. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 716 (6th ed. 2003).
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